Secret ofHegel in two volumes by James H. Stirling, originally published in 1865 with, eventually, a third edition following in 1898. The reviewer concluded: "Stirling has well kept Hegel's secret." In any case, nobody reads Stirling any more. Where have all the questions gone? A new generation of Hegel translators, commentators, and scholars has whisked them away from their nineteenth-century colleagues. The answers are still "well kept," not because the new philosophers lack incisiveness but because philosophy is a perpetual churning, a defiler of custom, a renegade in the house of learning. Many of the vaults of the venerable philosophers have been broken into by body snatchers; organs and members and bones have been farmed out to publishers. Of the major thinkers, perhaps only Descartes is safe: pieces of his body seem to be buried or scattered all over Europe-a part of his liver in Italy, his gall bladder in Sweden, a segment of his small intestine in Switzerland, and so on. A philosophical travel guide would be needed to resurrect his whereabouts. Are we ravagers of texts as well?
If bioethics is in danger of losing touch with the "big questions," what might be called "humanistic philosophy" is not. There remains, of course, a ratio: The smaller or the tinier the questions, the greater the opportunity to give, a more precise answer. What precision means in this context is another matter: what has been gained and what has been lost in being "precise" remain relevant issues. From the arithmetician's point of view, two times two equalling four is indubitable, unshakable, immaculate; from the Underground Man's standpoint, "Twice-two-makes-four is .... nothing but a piece of impudence. Twice-two-makes-four is a farcical, dressedup fellow who stands across your path with arms akimbo and spits at you" [2] . Before attempting to ask or answer anything, let us reflect for a moment-for as long as this paper lasts-on our philosophical subject matter: on questioning and answering philosophically, not only in the academy but in ordinary life. I shall try to do this-reflect-in two ways. My first effort (let us call it Part One) will be concerned with a humanistic view of big questions; my second effort (Part Two) will approach the substance of Part One by way of indirection: through an account of a personal experience, which may be taken as a story or as a kind of parable.
PART ONE "Medicine is my lawful wife and literature is my mistress. When I get tired of one I spend the night with the other." [3] -Anton Chekhov If we ask of life or of human experience: What does it all mean?, we might be accused of asking a misposed, if not meaningless, question. The "it" in "What does it all mean?" seems to be not only referentially obscure but rather deceitful. Is there a proper "it" at all or only discrete events, having reasonably clear meanings, meanings which become distorted when compressed into an "it" which throbs but never signifies? What I propose to do now is to "take on" the "it."
If, as I think, the "it" is not reducible to the elements which supposedly comprise the meaning of "experience" or "world," then we are all compelled to relinquish some rather "tatty" [4] language and, in particular, renounce a cluster of botched nouns. "Human experience" or even "the human condition" will not carry us far enough; they have become weary bits of language: the coolies of the old existential enterprise. Nor do philosophical neologisms help very often. Students who find elevation in saying "presencing" as an English translation ofAnwesen, will eventually The force of these questions lies not in their comprehensiveness but in the subtlety through which the first three lead to the fourth. The questions are not fixed; they are contained in the final one in a transformed manner; knowledge, ethics, and faith are ways, whether subterranean or surface-bound, whether hermetic or mundane, of being able to formulate the anthropological question. Anthropology here is not the empirical science with which we are familiar but a philosophical effort, I would suggest, to illuminate the "it" in which and with which man is a contender and contends. The question, What is Man?, is a transcendental one and cannot be answered by empirical inquiry. What, then, is the "it"? To call the "it" a transcendental something will surely try the patience of the most sympathetic person. I propose a few direct answers in more straightforward language. First, the "it" is the dense enclosure of everyday action, taken as a referent when and because any single item of the everyday world fails to denote the plenum of which it,is a part. Second, the "it" is a glory of interconnections, no one of which can ever be separated out cleanly. Everything that happens adds to, repeats, or points back to that sum of experience which cannot be enumerated because the part has been changed by the whole it helps to form. Abandoning any claim to being understood, however-for just a moment-I would say that the first three questions are transfigured, preserved, and "formed"-Hegel would say aufgehoben-in the anthropological question. The point is that philosophical anthropology rather than bioethics is the discipline which seeks to understand Man. What does it all mean?, far from being a question of meditation, is better understood as a cry of fury. The "it" is sometimes the expression of exhausted patience: "Damn it!", "To hell with it!", "Curse it!" I recognize that there are happier connotations in which "it" is expressed, but for the present I am interested in a particular circumstance in which the "it" manifests a more hectic compulsion. In War and Peace, Tolstoy describes not only the essential confusion, misguidedness, misinformation, incoherence of battle, but calls out the lasting obscurity of it. At the battle of Austerlitz, Rostov asks himself: "What does it mean? What is it?" [5] . That last "it" is closest to the "it" of: What does it mean? As for Kant's questions, we It might appear that we have exchanged one set of terms for another, neither of which is all that clear. In saying that I think that philosophical anthropology is concerned with more fundamental questions than are considered by bioethics, I have no interest in criticizing bioethicists or their discipline. Rather, I am suggesting that beneath one level of inquiry lies another: philosophical anthropology. The question What is Man? is qualitatively of a different order than the question What is ham? It is not primarily a matter of complexity. The anthropological question is raised by a being who is, at the same time, the object of the inquiry. At least, it may be said that the anthropological question turns upon the questioner. We are asking about ourselves. The "it" of What does it all mean? is then each of us translated into a universality which we are. The "it" reverts to itself. One quick result of this mode of reflection is that the status of "practical" applications or implications of philosophical anthropology are to be located in a movement of return from something taken as simply given to the constitutive sources of any "given." If we are to treat a human being we must understand that human being, his "givenness"-his simple presence before us-as trailing behind it not only the data but the scenes of a life.
If the anthropological question is to be "applied" as a humanistic instrument relevant to medicine, then the natural place and time for such application is in medical school. Very likely, I am ill-informed about the latest changes in the curriculum, that medical students are reading Montaigne without a brown wrapper, that they are deep in categories, but I retain the impression that humanism and philosophy remain "causes," not realities. The solution to overcoming a void between humanism and medicine may no longer be found in "art"; or perhaps the problem may be pushed back once again to the undergraduate preparation of medical students-or further back than that. Although I have never been invited to address an incoming class of first-year medical students, I have had such a request from a Yale college. I declined because I knew I would say: "There's still time, go home! Don't come! Ask your parents to get their money back! Be wise: vacate these precincts." Since I couldn't very well extend such a greeting, I stayed away. Years ago, I remember reading an essay by Sir William Osler in which he said something like this to medical students, "Once in a while, put down your anatomy or physiology text and pick up a literary work for an interlude of fifteen minutes or so." I seem to be saying: "Every so often put down your literary work and spend fifteen minutes or so on your anatomy." It just won't do. No doubt, that is why I haven't been invited to give a talk to the new medical class.
What I am after lies in a different direction: not in going ahead but in going back-returning to one's origins and sources. Man is a being who should be characterized by such a reversal, by being a returner. To what? To what it all means. With enough good will and extrapolation, one might find a clue to such returning in medical terms.
In the first edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1771), there is an article on medicine which contains a curious passage on what is termed "The Iliac Passion." It begins: "The iliac passion is a pain in the small intestines, apt to turn to an inflammation, in which their peristaltic motion is inverted, and their contents and even the excrements themselves are voided by the mouth in vomiting" [6] . Little wonder that the article on metaphysics follows swiftly. I don't know whether this eighteenth-century medical phenomenon has a modern equivalent, but I have taken the clotted, fluid archeology in the vast reversal of the iliac passion as a metaphor appropriate to philosophy.
PART TWO "Seize on him, Furies, take him unto torment!" [7] -William Shakespeare The story I promised to tell cannot be understood without a preliminary account of what happened to me in part of the summer and fall of 1988, when I spent about two months in the hospital as a patient. I will try to give a concise report of my medical adventures. After several operations and procedures, I developed an atypical pneumonia and suffered respiratory failure. For several weeks, I was in the intensive care unit (ICU) of the hospital with a respiratory tube down my throat. When I left the ICU for another floor of the hospital, I was unable to speak, whisper, or even croak. Although my excellent doctors assured me that, in time, my voice would return, I was meanwhile able to communicate only by writing messages. Before proceeding any further, let me say that I was what is called a "difficult" patient, extremely argumentative. Imagine a cafe where the patrons are chiefly medical people, somewhere to gather for a drink or a bite to eat-suppose we call it Scarpa's Place-and where two residents are discussing me:
"Have you been in to see 602?" "Yeah, what a creep." "What happened?" "I asked him if he had any pain in his chest, and he tells me not pain but pressure. What difference is there between pain and pressure, I asked him, and, would you believe it, he starts a long business about the theory of knowledge." "I understand that he's a professor of psychology." "Yeah. That guy is really sick. They shouldn't admit people like that to the hospital."
"Must have gotten to you-you don't look so good." "I'm under a lot of pressure." "Feeling pain, huh?" I should add that I had developed an ICU psychosis, which came and went erratically. There were plots and hallucinations. For a time, I believed that the nurses were trying to poison me, that a murder had taken place close to my bed and was being concealed by the hospital security people. But the most interesting facet of that psychosis went unnoticed: I believed that the present was the period between 1938 and 1942. That phenomenological treasure was lost upon everybody. During some little squabble with an intern, I recall saying, "But don't you realize that Trotsky just died?" I might as well have named Kublai Khan. All together, things did not proceed smoothly. Neither would I "go gentle into that good night," nor would I sit quiet in the sunshine. It was a demanding time.
The essential problem that came with my new room and my voicelessness surfaced soon enough. When I pressed the nurse's call button, a nurse did not come; instead, a voice sounded from a remote part of the room: "Yes, what is it?" It was an impasse which I brought to the attention of a high authority, who recommended a second authority who was in charge of impasses. My family explained the difficulty. The impasse-authority assured all of us that a special note would be placed next to my name in the nurse's station; in fact, that all patients with particular problems-the blind, the deaf, and the dumb, among them-had special notations next to their names. The speaker was crisp, forceful, lucid, foursquare, and convincing; I suspected that there was a trace of lunacy in her eyes, but I believed that she believed what she was saying. My suspicion was borne out later. The entire matter of notations next to patients' names was a fantasy, a utopian whimsy. And, I am convinced, she did believe what she was saying. It was a perfect instance of what Sartre calls "bad faith." He writes: "Bad faith ... has in appearance the structure of falsehood. Only what changes everything is the fact that in bad faith it is from myself that I am hiding the truth" [8] . The And then it happened. Mr. Barnett stepped down into chaos. He fell terrifically hard, his head striking the plaster wall with a crack that could have been heard in Vladivostok. A clamorous ringing came from the guard rail, which part of his body had struck-the aeolian harp of madness. Altogether, it made a frightful racket; the crash brought in the troops, a procession led by a resident, followed by two nurses, and, bringing up the rear, the minder, who, apparently had written a monograph while answering the call of nature. After the necessary examinations, Mr. Barnett was returned to bed in a straightjacket-Prometheus bound, though I never learned whether anyone killed his vulture. The troops departed, except for the resident, who stood close to the wall, examining the place where Mr. Barnett's head had hit. Was he searching for traces of blood or was he looking for hairline fractures in the plaster? Perhaps he was not really a resident but someone from Buildings and Grounds. Eventually, he turned from the wall and started walking toward the door. As he passed my bed, he said, rather bitterly I thought, "Why didn't you ring for a nurse?"
Early the following morning, Mr. Barnett was taken from the room, still in a straightjacket. He was stretched out on a special gurney, one equipped with thick leather straps which bound the patient every foot or so, for the entire length of his body. His face seemed to me to be proud and prophetic. Barnett 
